CWE-322 · Słabość
Key Exchange without Entity Authentication
- Abstrakcja
- Bazowa
- Status
- Szkic
- Ryzyko wykorzystania
- wysokie
- Dodano
- 19 lipca 2006
- Ostatnia zmiana
- 11 grudnia 2025
Opis
The product performs a key exchange with an actor without verifying the identity of that actor.
Performing a key exchange will preserve the integrity of the information sent between two entities, but this will not guarantee that the entities are who they claim they are. This may enable an attacker to impersonate an actor by modifying traffic between the two entities. Typically, this involves a victim client that contacts a malicious server that is impersonating a trusted server. If the client skips authentication or ignores an authentication failure, the malicious server may request authentication information from the user. The malicious server can then use this authentication information to log in to the trusted server using the victim's credentials, sniff traffic between the victim and trusted server, etc.
Skutki
Access Control
Bypass Protection Mechanism
No authentication takes place in this process, bypassing an assumed protection of encryption.
Confidentiality
Read Application Data
The encrypted communication between a user and a trusted host may be subject to sniffing by any actor in the communication path.
Zapobieganie
Architecture and Design
Ensure that proper authentication is included in the system design.
Implementation
Understand and properly implement all checks necessary to ensure the identity of entities involved in encrypted communications.
Słabość nadrzędna
Może prowadzić do
Pokrewna
Kiedy powstaje
- Architecture and Design — OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.
Dotyczy
Not Language-Specific
Źródła
- The CLASP Application Security Process — Secure Software, Inc., 2005
- 24 Deadly Sins of Software Security — Michael Howard, David LeBlanc, John Viega, "Sin 23: Improper Use of PKI, Especially SSL." Page 347, McGraw-Hill, 2010
- The Art of Software Security Assessment — Mark Dowd, John McDonald, Justin Schuh, Chapter 2, "Untrustworthy Credentials", Page 37, Addison Wesley, 2006
Wpis z katalogu CWE 4.20.