CWE-940 · Słabość
Improper Verification of Source of a Communication Channel
- Abstrakcja
- Bazowa
- Status
- Niekompletny
- Dodano
- 13 lutego 2014
- Ostatnia zmiana
- 30 kwietnia 2026
Opis
The product establishes a communication channel to handle an incoming request that has been initiated by an actor, but it does not properly verify that the request is coming from the expected origin.
When an attacker can successfully establish a communication channel from an untrusted origin, the attacker may be able to gain privileges and access unexpected functionality.
Skutki
Access Control, Other
Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; Varies by Context; Bypass Protection Mechanism
An attacker can access any functionality that is inadvertently accessible to the source.
Zapobieganie
Architecture and Design
Use a mechanism that can validate the identity of the source, such as a certificate, and validate the integrity of data to ensure that it cannot be modified in transit using an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AITM) attack.
When designing functionality of actions in the URL scheme, consider whether the action should be accessible to all mobile applications, or if an allowlist of applications to interface with is appropriate.
Przykłady podatności
- CVE-2025-3651 desktop product does not properly verify the source of a communication channel, allowing command execution
- CVE-2000-1218 DNS server can accept DNS updates from hosts that it did not query, leading to cache poisoning
- CVE-2005-0877 DNS server can accept DNS updates from hosts that it did not query, leading to cache poisoning
- CVE-2001-1452 DNS server caches glue records received from non-delegated name servers
Słabość nadrzędna
Słabości podrzędne
Kiedy powstaje
- Architecture and Design
- Implementation — REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
Dotyczy
Not Language-Specific, Mobile
Uwagi
While many access control issues involve authenticating the user, this weakness is more about authenticating the actual source of the communication channel itself; there might not be any "user" in such cases.
Źródła
- A Taxonomy of Security Faults in the UNIX Operating System — Taimur Aslam, 1995
Wpis z katalogu CWE 4.20.