Katalog CWE

CWE-601 · Słabość

URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')

Abstrakcja
Bazowa
Status
Szkic
Ryzyko wykorzystania
niskie
Dodano
7 maja 2007
Ostatnia zmiana
11 grudnia 2025

Podatności CVE z tą słabościąPełny wpis na cwe.mitre.org ↗

Opis

The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect.

Inne nazwy

Open Redirect
Cross-site Redirect
Cross-domain Redirect
Unvalidated Redirect
Drive-by download
an attack, sometimes enabled by open redirects, which redirects the victim to a site that automatically triggers a download action of malicious software or files

Skutki

  • Access Control

    Bypass Protection Mechanism; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity

    The user may be redirected to an untrusted page that contains malware which may then compromise the user's system. In some cases, an open redirect can also enable the immediate download of a file without the user's permission, because the redirection to an external site may lead to endpoints on those sites that automatically trigger a download action ("drive-by download" [REF-1478]). This will expose the user to extensive risk. The user's interaction with the web server may also be compromised if the malware conducts keylogging or other attacks that steal credentials, personally identifiable information (PII), or other important data.

  • Access Control, Confidentiality, Other

    Bypass Protection Mechanism; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; Other

    By modifying the URL value to a malicious site, an attacker may successfully launch a phishing scam. The user may be subjected to phishing attacks by being redirected to an untrusted page. The phishing attack may point to an attacker controlled web page that appears to be a trusted web site. The phishers may then steal the user's credentials and then use these credentials to access the legitimate web site. Because the server name in the modified link is identical to the original site, phishing attempts have a more trustworthy appearance.

Zapobieganie

  • Implementation · Input Validation

    Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.

    When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."

    Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

    Use a list of approved URLs or domains to be used for redirection.

  • Architecture and Design

    Use an intermediate disclaimer page that provides the user with a clear warning that they are leaving the current site. Implement a long timeout before the redirect occurs, or force the user to click on the link. Be careful to avoid XSS problems (CWE-79) when generating the disclaimer page.

  • Architecture and Design · Enforcement by Conversion

    When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.

    For example, ID 1 could map to "/login.asp" and ID 2 could map to "http://www.example.com/". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-45] provide this capability.

  • Architecture and Design

    Ensure that no externally-supplied requests are honored by requiring that all redirect requests include a unique nonce generated by the application [REF-483]. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330).

  • Architecture and Design, Implementation · Attack Surface Reduction

    Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.

    Many open redirect problems occur because the programmer assumed that certain inputs could not be modified, such as cookies and hidden form fields.

  • Operation · Firewall

    Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

    Skuteczność: Moderate

Przykłady podatności

Słabość nadrzędna

Kiedy powstaje

Dotyczy

Not Language-Specific, Web Based, Web Server

Uwagi

Whether this issue poses a vulnerability will be subject to the intended behavior of the application. For example, a search engine might intentionally provide redirects to arbitrary URLs.

Źródła

  1. Exploitable Redirects on the Web: Identification, Prevalence, and Defense — Craig A. Shue, Andrew J. Kalafut, Minaxi Gupta
  2. Open redirect vulnerabilities: definition and prevention — Russ McRee, Page 43, (IN)SECURE, 2008
  3. Top 25 Series - Rank 23 - Open Redirect — Jason Lam, SANS Software Security Institute, 2010
  4. OWASP Enterprise Security API (ESAPI) Project — OWASP
  5. Drive-by download — Wikipedia, 2025
  6. State-of-the-Art Resources (SOAR) for Software Vulnerability Detection, Test, and Evaluation — Gregory Larsen, E. Kenneth Hong Fong, David A. Wheeler, Rama S. Moorthy, 2014
  7. D3FEND: Application Layer Firewall — D3FEND

Wpis z katalogu CWE 4.20.