Covert Storage Channel

Opis

A covert storage channel transfers information through the setting of bits by one program and the reading of those bits by another. What distinguishes this case from that of ordinary operation is that the bits are used to convey encoded information.

Covert storage channels occur when out-of-band data is stored in messages for the purpose of memory reuse. Covert channels are frequently classified as either storage or timing channels. Examples would include using a file intended to hold only audit information to convey user passwords--using the name of a file or perhaps status bits associated with it that can be read by all users to signal the contents of the file. Steganography, concealing information in such a manner that no one but the intended recipient knows of the existence of the message, is a good example of a covert storage channel.

Skutki

• Confidentiality

  Read Application Data

  Covert storage channels may provide attackers with important information about the system in question.

• Integrity, Confidentiality

  Read Application Data

  If these messages or packets are sent with unnecessary data contained within, it may tip off malicious listeners as to the process that created the message. With this information, attackers may learn any number of things, including the hardware platform, operating system, or algorithms used by the sender. This information can be of significant value to the user in launching further attacks.

Zapobieganie

• Implementation

  Ensure that all reserved fields are set to zero before messages are sent and that no unnecessary information is included.

Słabość nadrzędna

• CWE-514 Covert Channel

Kiedy powstaje

• Implementation

Dotyczy

Not Language-Specific

Uwagi

As of CWE 4.9, members of the CWE Hardware SIG are working to improve CWE's coverage of transient execution weaknesses, which include issues related to Spectre, Meltdown, and other attacks that create or exploit covert channels. As a result of that work, this entry might change in CWE 4.10.

Źródła

1. A Taxonomy of Computer Program Security Flaws, with Examples — Carl E. Landwehr, Alan R. Bull, John P. McDermott, William S. Choi, 1993