Missing Support for Integrity Check

Opis

The product uses a transmission protocol that does not include a mechanism for verifying the integrity of the data during transmission, such as a checksum.

If integrity check values or "checksums" are omitted from a protocol, there is no way of determining if data has been corrupted in transmission. The lack of checksum functionality in a protocol removes the first application-level check of data that can be used. The end-to-end philosophy of checks states that integrity checks should be performed at the lowest level that they can be completely implemented. Excluding further sanity checks and input validation performed by applications, the protocol's checksum is the most important level of checksum, since it can be performed more completely than at any previous level and takes into account entire messages, as opposed to single packets.

Skutki

• Integrity, Other

  Other

  Data that is parsed and used may be corrupted.

• Non-Repudiation, Other

  Hide Activities; Other

  Without a checksum it is impossible to determine if any changes have been made to the data after it was sent.

Zapobieganie

• Architecture and Design

  Add an appropriately sized checksum to the protocol, ensuring that data received may be simply validated before it is parsed and used.

• Implementation

  Ensure that the checksums present in the protocol design are properly implemented and added to each message before it is sent.

Przykłady podatności

• CVE-2025-32890 Mesh device uses a cryptographic algorithm without integrity checking, allowing modification of messages

Słabość nadrzędna

• CWE-345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity

Pokrewna

• CWE-354 Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value

Kiedy powstaje

• Architecture and Design — OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.
• Implementation

Dotyczy

Not Language-Specific

Źródła

1. The CLASP Application Security Process — Secure Software, Inc., 2005
2. 24 Deadly Sins of Software Security — Michael Howard, David LeBlanc, John Viega, "Sin 15: Not Updating Easily." Page 231, McGraw-Hill, 2010