Katalog CWE

CWE-327 · Słabość

Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm

Abstrakcja
Klasa
Status
Szkic
Ryzyko wykorzystania
wysokie
Dodano
19 lipca 2006
Ostatnia zmiana
11 grudnia 2025

Podatności CVE z tą słabościąPełny wpis na cwe.mitre.org ↗

Opis

The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol.

Cryptographic algorithms are the methods by which data is scrambled to prevent observation or influence by unauthorized actors. Insecure cryptography can be exploited to expose sensitive information, modify data in unexpected ways, spoof identities of other users or devices, or other impacts.

It is very difficult to produce a secure algorithm, and even high-profile algorithms by accomplished cryptographic experts have been broken. Well-known techniques exist to break or weaken various kinds of cryptography. Accordingly, there are a small number of well-understood and heavily studied algorithms that should be used by most products. Using a non-standard or known-insecure algorithm is dangerous because a determined adversary may be able to break the algorithm and compromise whatever data has been protected.

Since the state of cryptography advances so rapidly, it is common for an algorithm to be considered "unsafe" even if it was once thought to be strong. This can happen when new attacks are discovered, or if computing power increases so much that the cryptographic algorithm no longer provides the amount of protection that was originally thought.

For a number of reasons, this weakness is even more challenging to manage with hardware deployment of cryptographic algorithms as opposed to software implementation. First, if a flaw is discovered with hardware-implemented cryptography, the flaw cannot be fixed in most cases without a recall of the product, because hardware is not easily replaceable like software. Second, because the hardware product is expected to work for years, the adversary's computing power will only increase over time.

Skutki

  • Confidentiality

    Read Application Data

    The confidentiality of sensitive data may be compromised by the use of a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm.

  • Integrity

    Modify Application Data

    The integrity of sensitive data may be compromised by the use of a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm.

  • Accountability, Non-Repudiation

    Hide Activities

    If the cryptographic algorithm is used to ensure the identity of the source of the data (such as digital signatures), then a broken algorithm will compromise this scheme and the source of the data cannot be proven.

Zapobieganie

  • Architecture and Design · Libraries or Frameworks

    When there is a need to store or transmit sensitive data, use strong, up-to-date cryptographic algorithms to encrypt that data. Select a well-vetted algorithm that is currently considered to be strong by experts in the field, and use well-tested implementations. As with all cryptographic mechanisms, the source code should be available for analysis.

    For example, US government systems require FIPS 140-2 certification [REF-1192].

    Do not develop custom or private cryptographic algorithms. They will likely be exposed to attacks that are well-understood by cryptographers. Reverse engineering techniques are mature. If the algorithm can be compromised if attackers find out how it works, then it is especially weak.

    Periodically ensure that the cryptography has not become obsolete. Some older algorithms, once thought to require a billion years of computing time, can now be broken in days or hours. This includes MD4, MD5, SHA1, DES, and other algorithms that were once regarded as strong. [REF-267]

  • Architecture and Design

    Ensure that the design allows one cryptographic algorithm to be replaced with another in the next generation or version. Where possible, use wrappers to make the interfaces uniform. This will make it easier to upgrade to stronger algorithms. With hardware, design the product at the Intellectual Property (IP) level so that one cryptographic algorithm can be replaced with another in the next generation of the hardware product.

    Skuteczność: Defense in Depth

  • Architecture and Design

    Carefully manage and protect cryptographic keys (see CWE-320). If the keys can be guessed or stolen, then the strength of the cryptography itself is irrelevant.

  • Architecture and Design · Libraries or Frameworks

    Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].

    Industry-standard implementations will save development time and may be more likely to avoid errors that can occur during implementation of cryptographic algorithms. Consider the ESAPI Encryption feature.

  • Implementation, Architecture and Design

    When using industry-approved techniques, use them correctly. Don't cut corners by skipping resource-intensive steps (CWE-325). These steps are often essential for preventing common attacks.

Przykłady podatności

Słabość nadrzędna

Pokrewna

Słabości podrzędne

Kiedy powstaje

Dotyczy

Not Language-Specific, Verilog, VHDL, Not Technology-Specific, ICS/OT

Uwagi

Since CWE 4.4, various cryptography-related entries, including CWE-327 and CWE-1240, have been slated for extensive research, analysis, and community consultation to define consistent terminology, improve relationships, and reduce overlap or duplication. As of CWE 4.6, this work is still ongoing.

Źródła

  1. Applied Cryptography — Bruce Schneier, John Wiley & Sons, 1996
  2. Handbook of Applied Cryptography — Alfred J. Menezes, Paul C. van Oorschot, Scott A. Vanstone, 1996
  3. Avoiding bogus encryption products: Snake Oil FAQ — C Matthew Curtin, 1998
  4. FIPS PUB 140-2: SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULES — Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2001
  5. Microsoft Scraps Old Encryption in New Code — Paul F. Roberts, 2005
  6. Writing Secure Code — Michael Howard, David LeBlanc, Chapter 8, "Cryptographic Foibles" Page 259, Microsoft Press, 2002
  7. 24 Deadly Sins of Software Security — Michael Howard, David LeBlanc, John Viega, "Sin 21: Using the Wrong Cryptography." Page 315, McGraw-Hill, 2010
  8. Top 25 Series - Rank 24 - Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm — Johannes Ullrich, SANS Software Security Institute, 2010
  9. The Art of Software Security Assessment — Mark Dowd, John McDonald, Justin Schuh, Chapter 2, "Insufficient or Obsolete Encryption", Page 44, Addison Wesley, 2006
  10. Automated Source Code Security Measure (ASCSM) — Object Management Group (OMG), ASCSM-CWE-327, 2016
  11. The CLASP Application Security Process — Secure Software, Inc., 2005
  12. FIPS PUB 140-3: SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULES — Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2019
  13. OT:ICEFALL: The legacy of "insecure by design" and its implications for certifications and risk management — Forescout Vedere Labs, 2022
  14. State-of-the-Art Resources (SOAR) for Software Vulnerability Detection, Test, and Evaluation — Gregory Larsen, E. Kenneth Hong Fong, David A. Wheeler, Rama S. Moorthy, 2014
  15. D3FEND: D3-TL Trusted Library — D3FEND

Wpis z katalogu CWE 4.20.