CWE-327 · Słabość
Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
- Abstrakcja
- Klasa
- Status
- Szkic
- Ryzyko wykorzystania
- wysokie
- Dodano
- 19 lipca 2006
- Ostatnia zmiana
- 11 grudnia 2025
Opis
The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol.
Cryptographic algorithms are the methods by which data is scrambled to prevent observation or influence by unauthorized actors. Insecure cryptography can be exploited to expose sensitive information, modify data in unexpected ways, spoof identities of other users or devices, or other impacts.
It is very difficult to produce a secure algorithm, and even high-profile algorithms by accomplished cryptographic experts have been broken. Well-known techniques exist to break or weaken various kinds of cryptography. Accordingly, there are a small number of well-understood and heavily studied algorithms that should be used by most products. Using a non-standard or known-insecure algorithm is dangerous because a determined adversary may be able to break the algorithm and compromise whatever data has been protected.
Since the state of cryptography advances so rapidly, it is common for an algorithm to be considered "unsafe" even if it was once thought to be strong. This can happen when new attacks are discovered, or if computing power increases so much that the cryptographic algorithm no longer provides the amount of protection that was originally thought.
For a number of reasons, this weakness is even more challenging to manage with hardware deployment of cryptographic algorithms as opposed to software implementation. First, if a flaw is discovered with hardware-implemented cryptography, the flaw cannot be fixed in most cases without a recall of the product, because hardware is not easily replaceable like software. Second, because the hardware product is expected to work for years, the adversary's computing power will only increase over time.
Skutki
Confidentiality
Read Application Data
The confidentiality of sensitive data may be compromised by the use of a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm.
Integrity
Modify Application Data
The integrity of sensitive data may be compromised by the use of a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm.
Accountability, Non-Repudiation
Hide Activities
If the cryptographic algorithm is used to ensure the identity of the source of the data (such as digital signatures), then a broken algorithm will compromise this scheme and the source of the data cannot be proven.
Zapobieganie
Architecture and Design · Libraries or Frameworks
When there is a need to store or transmit sensitive data, use strong, up-to-date cryptographic algorithms to encrypt that data. Select a well-vetted algorithm that is currently considered to be strong by experts in the field, and use well-tested implementations. As with all cryptographic mechanisms, the source code should be available for analysis.
For example, US government systems require FIPS 140-2 certification [REF-1192].
Do not develop custom or private cryptographic algorithms. They will likely be exposed to attacks that are well-understood by cryptographers. Reverse engineering techniques are mature. If the algorithm can be compromised if attackers find out how it works, then it is especially weak.
Periodically ensure that the cryptography has not become obsolete. Some older algorithms, once thought to require a billion years of computing time, can now be broken in days or hours. This includes MD4, MD5, SHA1, DES, and other algorithms that were once regarded as strong. [REF-267]
Architecture and Design
Ensure that the design allows one cryptographic algorithm to be replaced with another in the next generation or version. Where possible, use wrappers to make the interfaces uniform. This will make it easier to upgrade to stronger algorithms. With hardware, design the product at the Intellectual Property (IP) level so that one cryptographic algorithm can be replaced with another in the next generation of the hardware product.
Skuteczność: Defense in Depth
Architecture and Design
Carefully manage and protect cryptographic keys (see CWE-320). If the keys can be guessed or stolen, then the strength of the cryptography itself is irrelevant.
Architecture and Design · Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Industry-standard implementations will save development time and may be more likely to avoid errors that can occur during implementation of cryptographic algorithms. Consider the ESAPI Encryption feature.
Implementation, Architecture and Design
When using industry-approved techniques, use them correctly. Don't cut corners by skipping resource-intensive steps (CWE-325). These steps are often essential for preventing common attacks.
Przykłady podatności
- CVE-2022-30273 SCADA-based protocol supports a legacy encryption mode that uses Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) in ECB mode, which leaks patterns in messages and cannot protect integrity
- CVE-2022-30320 Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) uses a protocol with a cryptographically insecure hashing algorithm for passwords.
- CVE-2008-3775 Product uses "ROT-25" to obfuscate the password in the registry.
- CVE-2007-4150 product only uses "XOR" to obfuscate sensitive data
- CVE-2007-5460 product only uses "XOR" and a fixed key to obfuscate sensitive data
- CVE-2005-4860 Product substitutes characters with other characters in a fixed way, and also leaves certain input characters unchanged.
- CVE-2002-2058 Attackers can infer private IP addresses by dividing each octet by the MD5 hash of '20'.
- CVE-2008-3188 Product uses DES when MD5 has been specified in the configuration, resulting in weaker-than-expected password hashes.
- CVE-2005-2946 Default configuration of product uses MD5 instead of stronger algorithms that are available, simplifying forgery of certificates.
- CVE-2007-6013 Product uses the hash of a hash for authentication, allowing attackers to gain privileges if they can obtain the original hash.
Słabość nadrzędna
Pokrewna
Słabości podrzędne
Kiedy powstaje
- Architecture and Design — COMMISSION: This weakness refers to an incorrect design related to an architectural security tactic.
- Implementation — With hardware, the Architecture or Design Phase might start with compliant cryptography, but it is replaced with a non-compliant crypto during the later Implementation phase due to implementation constraints (e.g., not enough entropy to make it function properly, or not enough silicon real estate available to implement). Or, in rare cases (especially for long projects that span over years), the Architecture specifications might start with cryptography that was originally compliant at the time the Architectural specs were written, but over the time it became non-compliant due to progress made in attacking the crypto.
Dotyczy
Not Language-Specific, Verilog, VHDL, Not Technology-Specific, ICS/OT
Uwagi
Since CWE 4.4, various cryptography-related entries, including CWE-327 and CWE-1240, have been slated for extensive research, analysis, and community consultation to define consistent terminology, improve relationships, and reduce overlap or duplication. As of CWE 4.6, this work is still ongoing.
Źródła
- Applied Cryptography — Bruce Schneier, John Wiley & Sons, 1996
- Handbook of Applied Cryptography — Alfred J. Menezes, Paul C. van Oorschot, Scott A. Vanstone, 1996
- Avoiding bogus encryption products: Snake Oil FAQ — C Matthew Curtin, 1998
- FIPS PUB 140-2: SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULES — Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2001
- Microsoft Scraps Old Encryption in New Code — Paul F. Roberts, 2005
- Writing Secure Code — Michael Howard, David LeBlanc, Chapter 8, "Cryptographic Foibles" Page 259, Microsoft Press, 2002
- 24 Deadly Sins of Software Security — Michael Howard, David LeBlanc, John Viega, "Sin 21: Using the Wrong Cryptography." Page 315, McGraw-Hill, 2010
- Top 25 Series - Rank 24 - Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm — Johannes Ullrich, SANS Software Security Institute, 2010
- The Art of Software Security Assessment — Mark Dowd, John McDonald, Justin Schuh, Chapter 2, "Insufficient or Obsolete Encryption", Page 44, Addison Wesley, 2006
- Automated Source Code Security Measure (ASCSM) — Object Management Group (OMG), ASCSM-CWE-327, 2016
- The CLASP Application Security Process — Secure Software, Inc., 2005
- FIPS PUB 140-3: SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULES — Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2019
- OT:ICEFALL: The legacy of "insecure by design" and its implications for certifications and risk management — Forescout Vedere Labs, 2022
- State-of-the-Art Resources (SOAR) for Software Vulnerability Detection, Test, and Evaluation — Gregory Larsen, E. Kenneth Hong Fong, David A. Wheeler, Rama S. Moorthy, 2014
- D3FEND: D3-TL Trusted Library — D3FEND
Wpis z katalogu CWE 4.20.