Use of Hard-coded Password

Opis

The product contains a hard-coded password, which it uses for its own inbound authentication or for outbound communication to external components.

There are two main variations of a hard-coded password:

``` Inbound: the product contains an authentication mechanism that checks for a hard-coded password. Outbound: the product connects to another system or component, and it contains a hard-coded password for connecting to that component. ```

Skutki

• Access Control

  Gain Privileges or Assume Identity

  If hard-coded passwords are used, it is almost certain that malicious users can gain access through the account in question.

• Access Control

  Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; Hide Activities; Reduce Maintainability

  A hard-coded password typically leads to a significant authentication failure that can be difficult for the system administrator to detect. Once detected, it can be difficult to fix, so the administrator may be forced into disabling the product entirely.

Zapobieganie

• Architecture and Design

  For outbound authentication: store passwords outside of the code in a strongly-protected, encrypted configuration file or database that is protected from access by all outsiders, including other local users on the same system. Properly protect the key (CWE-320). If you cannot use encryption to protect the file, then make sure that the permissions are as restrictive as possible.

• Architecture and Design

  For inbound authentication: Rather than hard-code a default username and password for first time logins, utilize a "first login" mode that requires the user to enter a unique strong password.

• Architecture and Design

  Perform access control checks and limit which entities can access the feature that requires the hard-coded password. For example, a feature might only be enabled through the system console instead of through a network connection.

• Architecture and Design

  For inbound authentication: apply strong one-way hashes to your passwords and store those hashes in a configuration file or database with appropriate access control. That way, theft of the file/database still requires the attacker to try to crack the password. When receiving an incoming password during authentication, take the hash of the password and compare it to the hash that you have saved.

  Use randomly assigned salts for each separate hash that you generate. This increases the amount of computation that an attacker needs to conduct a brute-force attack, possibly limiting the effectiveness of the rainbow table method.

• Architecture and Design

  For front-end to back-end connections: Three solutions are possible, although none are complete.

  ``` The first suggestion involves the use of generated passwords which are changed automatically and must be entered at given time intervals by a system administrator. These passwords will be held in memory and only be valid for the time intervals. Next, the passwords used should be limited at the back end to only performing actions valid for the front end, as opposed to having full access. Finally, the messages sent should be tagged and checksummed with time sensitive values so as to prevent replay style attacks. ```

Przykłady podatności

• CVE-2022-29964 Distributed Control System (DCS) has hard-coded passwords for local shell access
• CVE-2021-37555 Telnet service for IoT feeder for dogs and cats has hard-coded password [REF-1288]
• CVE-2021-35033 Firmware for a WiFi router uses a hard-coded password for a BusyBox shell, allowing bypass of authentication through the UART port

Słabość nadrzędna

• CWE-798 Use of Hard-coded Credentials

Pokrewna

• CWE-321 Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key
• CWE-257 Storing Passwords in a Recoverable Format

Kiedy powstaje

• Implementation — REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
• Architecture and Design

Dotyczy

Not Language-Specific, ICS/OT

Uwagi

It might be appropriate to split this entry into an inbound variant and an outbound variant. These variants are likely to have different consequences, detectability, etc., although such differences are not suitable for a split. More importantly, from a vulnerability theory perspective, they might be characterized as different behaviors. The difference is in where the hard-coded password is stored - on the component performing the authentication, or the component that is connecting to the external component that requires authentication. However, as with many weaknesses, the "vulnerability topology" should not be regarded as important enough for splits. For example, separate weaknesses do not exist for client-to-server buffer overflows versus server-to-client buffer overflows.

In the Inbound variant, a default administration account may be created, and a simple password is hard-coded into the product and associated with that account. This hard-coded password is the same for each installation of the product, and it usually cannot be changed or disabled by system administrators without manually modifying the program, or otherwise patching the product. If the password is ever discovered or published (a common occurrence on the Internet), then anybody with knowledge of this password can access the product. Finally, since all installations of the product will have the same password, even across different organizations, this enables massive attacks such as worms to take place.

The Outbound variant can apply to front-end systems that authenticate with a back-end service. The back-end service may require a fixed password that can be discovered easily. The programmer may simply hard-code those back-end credentials into the front-end product. Any user of that program may be able to extract the password. Client-side systems with hard-coded passwords pose even more of a threat, since the extraction of a password from a binary is usually very simple.

Źródła

1. Seven Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software Security Errors — Katrina Tsipenyuk, Brian Chess, Gary McGraw, NIST, 2005
2. 24 Deadly Sins of Software Security — Michael Howard, David LeBlanc, John Viega, "Sin 19: Use of Weak Password-Based Systems." Page 279, McGraw-Hill, 2010
3. OT:ICEFALL: The legacy of "insecure by design" and its implications for certifications and risk management — Forescout Vedere Labs, 2022
4. Ethical hacking of a Smart Automatic Feed Dispenser — Julia Lokrantz, 2021
5. ICS Alert (ICS-ALERT-13-164-01): Medical Devices Hard-Coded Passwords — ICS-CERT, 2013