Katalog CWE

CWE-150 · Słabość

Improper Neutralization of Escape, Meta, or Control Sequences

Abstrakcja
Wariant
Status
Niekompletny
Dodano
19 lipca 2006
Ostatnia zmiana
30 kwietnia 2026

Podatności CVE z tą słabościąPełny wpis na cwe.mitre.org ↗

Opis

The product receives input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could be interpreted as escape, meta, or control character sequences when they are sent to a downstream component.

Inne nazwy

ANSI injection
injection of ANSI escape sequences.

Skutki

  • Integrity

    Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Hide Activities; Unexpected State

    ANSI escape codes can be used for low-severity attacks such as changing the color of console output, but they can also be used to arbitrarily move the cursor, clear the screen, and make fake prompts inside the interactive CLI via malicious user input. In some contexts - depending on the functionality of the terminal in use - ANSI escape codes can be used to execute arbitrary code.

Zapobieganie

  • Developers should anticipate that escape, meta and control characters/sequences will be injected/removed/manipulated in the input vectors of their product. Use an appropriate combination of denylists and allowlists to ensure only valid, expected and appropriate input is processed by the system.

  • Implementation · Input Validation

    Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.

    When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."

    Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

  • Implementation · Output Encoding

    While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).

  • Implementation · Input Validation

    Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.

  • Implementation

    When using output from an LLM, neutralize or strip escape codes before redirecting output to the terminal or other rendering engine that would process the codes. The neutralization could require that the character be printable and/or allowable whitespace, such as a carriage return or newline. Be deliberate about what to allow.

    Skuteczność: High

  • Build and Compilation

    When using an LLM: during tokenizer training, suppress escape codes from the tokenizer's vocabulary. Depending on context, this could be accomplished by removing the codes from input to the tokenizer, or removing the map from the string to its token ID. It is generally unlikely that this removal would adversely affect the quality or correctness of what is generated, e.g. advice requests for terminal settings to change colors.

    Skuteczność: Limited

Przykłady podatności

Słabość nadrzędna

Kiedy powstaje

Dotyczy

Not Language-Specific, AI/ML

Uwagi

As of CWE 4.20: while exploitation and research interest in ANSI escape codes (and other terminal sequences) was popular in the early 2000's [REF-1527] - and known as an attack vector going back to at least 1994 [REF-1532] - there has been renewed interest in this type of injection as new attack vectors have arrived (e.g., from LLM output, or CLIs that were not based on OS sessions).

Źródła

  1. flash.c — Phrack Issue 46, Volume 4 ("Line Noise"), 1994
  2. Terminal Emulator Security Issues — H D Moore, BugTraq, 2003
  3. \e[31m"?! ANSI Terminal security in 2023 and finding 10 CVEs — David Leadbeater, 2023
  4. Weaponizing Plain Text ANSI Escape Sequences as a Forensic Nightmare — STÖK, 2023
  5. Weaponizing Plain Text ANSI Escape Sequences as a Forensic Nightmare — STÖK, 2023
  6. LLM output can take over your computer — Leon Derczynski, 2024
  7. Terminal DiLLMa: LLM-powered Apps Can Hijack Your Terminal Via Prompt Injection — wunderwuzzi, 2024

Wpis z katalogu CWE 4.20.