Reliance on Insufficiently Trustworthy Component

Opis

The product is built from multiple separate components, but it uses a component that is not sufficiently trusted to meet expectations for security, reliability, updateability, and maintainability.

Many modern hardware and software products are built by combining multiple smaller components together into one larger entity, often during the design or architecture phase. For example, a hardware component might be built by a separate supplier, or the product might use an open-source software library from a third party.

Regardless of the source, each component should be sufficiently trusted to ensure correct, secure operation of the product. If a component is not trustworthy, it can produce significant risks for the overall product, such as vulnerabilities that cannot be patched fast enough (if at all); hidden functionality such as malware; inability to update or replace the component if needed for security purposes; hardware components built from parts that do not meet specifications in ways that can lead to weaknesses; etc. Note that a component might not be trustworthy even if it is owned by the product vendor, such as a software component whose source code is lost and was built by developers who left the company, or a component that was developed by a separate company that was acquired and brought into the product's own company.

Note that there can be disagreement as to whether a component is sufficiently trustworthy, since trust is ultimately subjective. Different stakeholders (e.g., customers, vendors, governments) have various threat models and ways to assess trust, and design/architecture choices might make tradeoffs between security, reliability, safety, privacy, cost, and other characteristics.

Skutki

• Other

  Reduce Maintainability

Zapobieganie

• Requirements, Architecture and Design, Implementation

  For each component, ensure that its supply chain is well-controlled with sub-tier suppliers using best practices. For third-party software components such as libraries, ensure that they are developed and actively maintained by reputable vendors.

• Architecture and Design, Implementation, Integration, Manufacturing

  Maintain a Bill of Materials for all components and sub-components of the product. For software, maintain a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM). According to [REF-1247], "An SBOM is a formal, machine-readable inventory of software components and dependencies, information about those components, and their hierarchical relationships."

• Operation, Patching and Maintenance

  Continue to monitor changes in each of the product's components, especially when the changes indicate new vulnerabilities, end-of-life (EOL) plans, supplier practices that affect trustworthiness, etc.

Przykłady podatności

• CVE-2020-9054 Chain: network-attached storage (NAS) device has a critical OS command injection (CWE-78) vulnerability that is actively exploited to place IoT devices into a botnet, but some products are "end-of-support" and cannot be patched (CWE-1277). [REF-1097]

Słabość nadrzędna

• CWE-710 Improper Adherence to Coding Standards

Słabości podrzędne

• CWE-1104 Use of Unmaintained Third Party Components
• CWE-1329 Reliance on Component That is Not Updateable
• CWE-1395 Dependency on Vulnerable Third-Party Component

Kiedy powstaje

• Requirements — Requirements might include criteria for which the only available solutions are provided by insufficiently trusted components.
• Architecture and Design — An insufficiently trusted component might be selected because it is less expensive to do in-house, requires expertise that is not available in-house, or might allow the product to reach the market faster.

Dotyczy

Not Architecture-Specific, Not Technology-Specific, ICS/OT

Uwagi

As of CWE 4.10, the name and description for this entry has undergone significant change and is still under public discussion, especially by members of the HW SIG.

Źródła

1. A06:2021 - Vulnerable and Outdated Components — OWASP, 2021
2. SOFTWARE BILL OF MATERIALS — National Telecommunications and Information Administration
3. Framing Software Component Transparency: Establishing a Common Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) — NTIA Multistakeholder Process on Software Component Transparency Framing Working Group, 2021
4. Zyxel Flaw Powers New Mirai IoT Botnet Strain — Brian Krebs, 2020