Katalog CWE

CWE-131 · Słabość

Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size

Abstrakcja
Bazowa
Status
Szkic
Ryzyko wykorzystania
wysokie
Dodano
19 lipca 2006
Ostatnia zmiana
11 grudnia 2025

Podatności CVE z tą słabościąPełny wpis na cwe.mitre.org ↗

Opis

The product does not correctly calculate the size to be used when allocating a buffer, which could lead to a buffer overflow.

Skutki

  • Integrity, Availability, Confidentiality

    DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Read Memory; Modify Memory

    If the incorrect calculation is used in the context of memory allocation, then the software may create a buffer that is smaller or larger than expected. If the allocated buffer is smaller than expected, this could lead to an out-of-bounds read or write (CWE-119), possibly causing a crash, allowing arbitrary code execution, or exposing sensitive data.

Zapobieganie

  • Implementation

    When allocating a buffer for the purpose of transforming, converting, or encoding an input, allocate enough memory to handle the largest possible encoding. For example, in a routine that converts "&" characters to "&" for HTML entity encoding, the output buffer needs to be at least 5 times as large as the input buffer.

  • Implementation

    Understand the programming language's underlying representation and how it interacts with numeric calculation (CWE-681). Pay close attention to byte size discrepancies, precision, signed/unsigned distinctions, truncation, conversion and casting between types, "not-a-number" calculations, and how the language handles numbers that are too large or too small for its underlying representation. [REF-7]

    Also be careful to account for 32-bit, 64-bit, and other potential differences that may affect the numeric representation.

  • Implementation · Input Validation

    Perform input validation on any numeric input by ensuring that it is within the expected range. Enforce that the input meets both the minimum and maximum requirements for the expected range.

  • Architecture and Design

    For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

  • Implementation

    When processing structured incoming data containing a size field followed by raw data, identify and resolve any inconsistencies between the size field and the actual size of the data (CWE-130).

  • Implementation

    When allocating memory that uses sentinels to mark the end of a data structure - such as NUL bytes in strings - make sure you also include the sentinel in your calculation of the total amount of memory that must be allocated.

  • Implementation

    Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.

    Skuteczność: Moderate

  • Implementation

    Use sizeof() on the appropriate data type to avoid CWE-467.

  • Implementation

    Use the appropriate type for the desired action. For example, in C/C++, only use unsigned types for values that could never be negative, such as height, width, or other numbers related to quantity. This will simplify validation and will reduce surprises related to unexpected casting.

  • Architecture and Design · Libraries or Frameworks

    Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].

    Use libraries or frameworks that make it easier to handle numbers without unexpected consequences, or buffer allocation routines that automatically track buffer size.

    Examples include safe integer handling packages such as SafeInt (C++) or IntegerLib (C or C++). [REF-106]

  • Operation, Build and Compilation · Environment Hardening

    Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.

    D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.

    Skuteczność: Defense in Depth

  • Operation, Build and Compilation · Environment Hardening

    Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.

    Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.

    For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].

    Skuteczność: Defense in Depth

  • Operation · Environment Hardening

    Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.

    For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].

    Skuteczność: Defense in Depth

  • Implementation · Compilation or Build Hardening

    Examine compiler warnings closely and eliminate problems with potential security implications, such as signed / unsigned mismatch in memory operations, or use of uninitialized variables. Even if the weakness is rarely exploitable, a single failure may lead to the compromise of the entire system.

  • Architecture and Design, Operation · Environment Hardening

    Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

  • Architecture and Design, Operation · Sandbox or Jail

    Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.

    OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.

    This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.

    Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.

    Skuteczność: Limited

Przykłady podatności

Słabość nadrzędna

Może prowadzić do

Słabości podrzędne

Kiedy powstaje

Dotyczy

Memory-Unsafe, C, C++

Uwagi

This is a broad category. Some examples include:

- simple math errors,

- incorrectly updating parallel counters,

- not accounting for size differences when "transforming" one input to another format (e.g. URL canonicalization or other transformation that can generate a result that's larger than the original input, i.e. "expansion").

This level of detail is rarely available in public reports, so it is difficult to find good examples.

This weakness may be a composite or a chain. It also may contain layering or perspective differences.

This issue may be associated with many different types of incorrect calculations (CWE-682), although the integer overflow (CWE-190) is probably the most prevalent. This can be primary to resource consumption problems (CWE-400), including uncontrolled memory allocation (CWE-789). However, its relationship with out-of-bounds buffer access (CWE-119) must also be considered.

Źródła

  1. SafeInt — David LeBlanc, Niels Dekker
  2. Top 25 Series - Rank 18 - Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size — Jason Lam, SANS Software Security Institute, 2010
  3. Address Space Layout Randomization in Windows Vista — Michael Howard
  4. Understanding DEP as a mitigation technology part 1 — Microsoft
  5. PaX
  6. Least Privilege — Sean Barnum, Michael Gegick, 2005
  7. Writing Secure Code — Michael Howard, David LeBlanc, Chapter 20, "Integer Overflows" Page 620, Microsoft Press, 2002
  8. 24 Deadly Sins of Software Security — Michael Howard, David LeBlanc, John Viega, "Sin 5: Buffer Overruns." Page 89, McGraw-Hill, 2010
  9. The Art of Software Security Assessment — Mark Dowd, John McDonald, Justin Schuh, Chapter 8, "Incrementing Pointers Incorrectly", Page 401, Addison Wesley, 2006
  10. Position Independent Executables (PIE) — Grant Murphy, Red Hat, 2012
  11. Prelink and address space randomization — John Richard Moser, 2006
  12. Jump Over ASLR: Attacking Branch Predictors to Bypass ASLR — Dmitry Evtyushkin, Dmitry Ponomarev, Nael Abu-Ghazaleh, 2016
  13. Stack Frame Canary Validation (D3-SFCV) — D3FEND, 2023
  14. Segment Address Offset Randomization (D3-SAOR) — D3FEND, 2023
  15. Process Segment Execution Prevention (D3-PSEP) — D3FEND, 2023
  16. Bypassing Browser Memory Protections: Setting back browser security by 10 years — Alexander Sotirov and Mark Dowd, Memory information leaks, 2008
  17. State-of-the-Art Resources (SOAR) for Software Vulnerability Detection, Test, and Evaluation — Gregory Larsen, E. Kenneth Hong Fong, David A. Wheeler, Rama S. Moorthy, 2014
  18. D3FEND: D3-TL Trusted Library — D3FEND
  19. AddressSanitizer

Wpis z katalogu CWE 4.20.