Insufficient or Incomplete Data Removal within Hardware Component

Opis

The product's data removal process does not completely delete all data and potentially sensitive information within hardware components.

Physical properties of hardware devices, such as remanence of magnetic media, residual charge of ROMs/RAMs, or screen burn-in may still retain sensitive data after a data removal process has taken place and power is removed.

Recovering data after erasure or overwriting is possible due to a phenomenon called data remanence. For example, if the same value is written repeatedly to a memory location, the corresponding memory cells can become physically altered to a degree such that even after the original data is erased that data can still be recovered through physical characterization of the memory cells.

Skutki

• Confidentiality

  Read Memory; Read Application Data

Zapobieganie

• Architecture and Design

  Apply blinding or masking techniques to implementations of cryptographic algorithms.

• Implementation

  Alter the method of erasure, add protection of media, or destroy the media to protect the data.

Przykłady podatności

• CVE-2019-8575 Firmware Data Deletion Vulnerability in which a base station factory reset might not delete all user information. The impact of this enables a new owner of a used device that has been "factory-default reset" with a vulnerable firmware version can still retrieve, at least, the previous owner's wireless network name, and the previous owner's wireless security (such as WPA2) key. This issue was addressed with improved, data deletion.

Słabość nadrzędna

• CWE-226 Sensitive Information in Resource Not Removed Before Reuse

Słabości podrzędne

• CWE-1330 Remanent Data Readable after Memory Erase

Kiedy powstaje

• Implementation

Dotyczy

Not Language-Specific, Not OS-Specific, Not Architecture-Specific, Not Technology-Specific

Uwagi

This entry is still under development and will continue to see updates and content improvements.

Źródła

1. Introduction to differential power analysis and related attacks — Paul Kocher, Joshua Jaffe, Benjamin Jun, 1998
2. The EM Side-Channel(s) — Dakshi Agrawal, Bruce Archambeault, Josyula R. Rao, Pankaj Rohatgi, 2007
3. RSA key extraction via low-bandwidth acoustic cryptanalysis — Daniel Genkin, Adi Shamir, Eran Tromer, 2014
4. Power Analysis for Cheapskates — Colin O'Flynn, 2013
5. Data Remanence in Semiconductor Devices — Peter Gutmann, 10th USENIX Security Symposium, 2001