Improper Protection of Physical Side Channels

Opis

The device does not contain sufficient protection mechanisms to prevent physical side channels from exposing sensitive information due to patterns in physically observable phenomena such as variations in power consumption, electromagnetic emissions (EME), or acoustic emissions.

An adversary could monitor and measure physical phenomena to detect patterns and make inferences, even if it is not possible to extract the information in the digital domain.

Physical side channels have been well-studied for decades in the context of breaking implementations of cryptographic algorithms or other attacks against security features. These side channels may be easily observed by an adversary with physical access to the device, or using a tool that is in close proximity. If the adversary can monitor hardware operation and correlate its data processing with power, EME, and acoustic measurements, the adversary might be able to recover of secret keys and data.

Skutki

• Confidentiality

  Read Memory; Read Application Data

Zapobieganie

• Architecture and Design

  Apply blinding or masking techniques to implementations of cryptographic algorithms.

• Implementation

  Add shielding or tamper-resistant protections to the device to increase the difficulty of obtaining measurements of the side-channel.

Przykłady podatności

• CVE-2022-35888 Power side-channels leak secret information from processor
• CVE-2021-3011 electromagnetic-wave side-channel in security-related microcontrollers allows extraction of private key
• CVE-2019-14353 Crypto hardware wallet's power consumption relates to total number of pixels illuminated, creating a side channel in the USB connection that allows attackers to determine secrets displayed such as PIN numbers and passwords
• CVE-2020-27211 Chain: microcontroller system-on-chip contains uses a register value stored in flash to set product protection state on the memory bus but does not contain protection against fault injection (CWE-1319), which leads to an incorrect initialization of the memory bus (CWE-1419) leading the product to be in an unprotected state.
• CVE-2013-4576 message encryption software uses certain instruction sequences that allows RSA key extraction using a chosen-ciphertext attack and acoustic cryptanalysis
• CVE-2020-28368 virtualization product allows recovery of AES keys from the guest OS using a side channel attack against a power/energy monitoring interface.
• CVE-2019-18673 power consumption varies based on number of pixels being illuminated in a display, allowing reading of secrets such as the PIN by using the USB interface to measure power consumption

Słabość nadrzędna

• CWE-203 Observable Discrepancy

Słabości podrzędne

• CWE-1255 Comparison Logic is Vulnerable to Power Side-Channel Attacks

Kiedy powstaje

• Implementation

Dotyczy

Not Language-Specific, Not OS-Specific, Not Architecture-Specific, Not Technology-Specific

Źródła

1. Introduction to differential power analysis and related attacks — Paul Kocher, Joshua Jaffe, Benjamin Jun, 1998
2. The EM Side-Channel(s) — Dakshi Agrawal, Bruce Archambeault, Josyula R. Rao, Pankaj Rohatgi, 2007
3. RSA key extraction via low-bandwidth acoustic cryptanalysis — Daniel Genkin, Adi Shamir, Eran Tromer, 2014
4. Power Analysis for Cheapskates — Colin O'Flynn, 2013
5. Data Remanence in Semiconductor Devices — Peter Gutmann, 10th USENIX Security Symposium, 2001
6. This Black Box Can Brute Force Crack iPhone PIN Passcodes — Graham Cluley, The Mac Security Blog, 2015
7. A Side Journey to Titan — Victor Lomne, Thomas Roche, 2021
8. A testing methodology for side-channel resistance validation — Gilbert Goodwill, Benjamin Jun, Josh Jaffe, Pankaj Rohatgi, 2011
9. ISO/IEC 17825:2016: Testing methods for the mitigation of non-invasive attack classes against cryptographic modules — ISO/IEC, 2016
10. Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) Derived Test Requirements (DTR) with AES — Cryptography Research Inc., 2015
11. Towards efficient and automated side-channel evaluations at design time — Danilo Šijaˇci´, Josep Balasch, Bohan Yang, Santosh Ghosh, Ingrid Verbauwhede, pp. 305-319, Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, 10(4), 2020
12. Efficient simulation of EM side-channel attack resilience — Amit Kumar, Cody Scarborough, Ali Yilmaz, Michael Orshansky, pp. 123-130, IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design (ICCAD), 2017
13. Pre-silicon Architecture Correlation Analysis (PACA): Identifying and Mitigating the Source of Side-channel Leakage at Gate-level — Yuan Yao, Tuna Tufan, Tarun Kathuria, Baris Ege, Ulkuhan Guler, Patrick Schaumont, IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2021
14. Power Analysis Attacks - Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards — Elisabeth Oswald, Thomas Popp, Stefan Mangard, 2007
15. Side-Channel Attacks on the Yubikey 2 One-Time Password Generator — David Oswald, Bastian Richter, Christof Paar, 2013
16. How (not) to Use Welch's T-test in Side-Channel Security Evaluations — François-Xavier Standaert, IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2017
17. A Critical Analysis of ISO 17825 ('Testing methods for the mitigation of non-invasive attack classes against cryptographic modules') — Carolyn Whitnall, Elisabeth Oswald, IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2019
18. Physical Security Attacks Against Silicon Devices — Texas Instruments, 2022
19. On The Susceptibility of Texas Instruments SimpleLink Platform Microcontrollers to Non-Invasive Physical Attacks — Lennert Wouters, Benedikt Gierlichs, Bart Preneel, 1.2 / 5, 2022
20. mod_exp.v — 2021
21. Fix CWE-1300 — 2021