CWE-1297 · Słabość
Unprotected Confidential Information on Device is Accessible by OSAT Vendors
- Abstrakcja
- Bazowa
- Status
- Niekompletny
- Dodano
- 29 maja 2020
- Ostatnia zmiana
- 11 grudnia 2025
Opis
The product does not adequately protect confidential information on the device from being accessed by Outsourced Semiconductor Assembly and Test (OSAT) vendors.
In contrast to complete vertical integration of architecting, designing, manufacturing, assembling, and testing chips all within a single organization, an organization can choose to simply architect and design a chip before outsourcing the rest of the process to OSAT entities (e.g., external foundries and test houses). In the latter example, the device enters an OSAT facility in a much more vulnerable pre-production stage where many debug and test modes are accessible. Therefore, the chipmaker must place a certain level of trust with the OSAT. To counter this, the chipmaker often requires the OSAT partner to enter into restrictive non-disclosure agreements (NDAs). Nonetheless, OSAT vendors likely have many customers, which increases the risk of accidental sharing of information. There may also be a security vulnerability in the information technology (IT) system of the OSAT facility. Alternatively, a malicious insider at the OSAT facility may carry out an insider attack. Considering these factors, it behooves the chipmaker to minimize any confidential information in the device that may be accessible to the OSAT vendor.
Logic errors during design or synthesis could misconfigure the interconnection of the debug components, which could provide improper authorization to sensitive information.
Skutki
Confidentiality, Integrity, Access Control, Authentication, Authorization, Availability, Accountability, Non-Repudiation
Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; Bypass Protection Mechanism; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Modify Memory; Modify Files or Directories
The impact depends on the confidential information itself and who is inadvertently granted access. For example, if the confidential information is a key that can unlock all the parts of a generation, the impact could be severe.
Zapobieganie
Architecture and Design
- Ensure that when an OSAT vendor is allowed to access test interfaces necessary for preproduction and returned parts, the vendor only pulls the minimal information necessary. Also, architect the product in such a way that, when an "unlock device" request comes, it only unlocks that specific part and not all the parts for that product line.
- Ensure that the product's non-volatile memory (NVM) is scrubbed of all confidential information and secrets before handing it over to an OSAT.
- Arrange to secure all communication between an OSAT facility and the chipmaker.
Skuteczność: Moderate
Słabość nadrzędna
Kiedy powstaje
- Implementation
Dotyczy
Verilog, VHDL, Not Language-Specific, Not OS-Specific, Not Architecture-Specific, Processor Hardware, Not Technology-Specific
Uwagi
This entry might be subject to CWE Scope Exclusion SCOPE.SITUATIONS (Focus on situations in which weaknesses may appear); SCOPE.HUMANPROC (Human/organizational process; and/or SCOPE.CUSTREL (Not customer-relevant).
This entry is still under development and will continue to see updates and content improvements.
Źródła
- Provably-Secure Logic Locking: From Theory To Practice — Muhammad Yasin, Abhrajit Sengupta, Mohammed Thari Nabeel, Mohammed Ashraf, Jeyavijayan (JV) Rajendran, Ozgur Sinanoglu
- Trustworthy Hardware Design: Combinational Logic Locking Techniques — Muhammad Yasin, Jeyavijayan (JV) Rajendran, Ozgur Sinanoglu
Wpis z katalogu CWE 4.20.