CWE-121 · Słabość
Stack-based Buffer Overflow
- Abstrakcja
- Wariant
- Status
- Szkic
- Ryzyko wykorzystania
- wysokie
- Dodano
- 19 lipca 2006
- Ostatnia zmiana
- 21 stycznia 2026
Opis
A stack-based buffer overflow condition is a condition where the buffer being overwritten is allocated on the stack (i.e., is a local variable or, rarely, a parameter to a function).
Inne nazwy
- Stack Overflow
- "Stack Overflow" is often used to mean the same thing as stack-based buffer overflow, however it is also used on occasion to mean stack exhaustion, usually a result from an excessively recursive function call. Due to the ambiguity of the term, use of stack overflow to describe either circumstance is discouraged.
- Stack Buffer Overflow
Skutki
Availability
Modify Memory; DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU); DoS: Resource Consumption (Memory)
Buffer overflows generally lead to crashes. Other attacks leading to lack of availability are possible, including putting the program into an infinite loop.
Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability, Access Control
Modify Memory; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Bypass Protection Mechanism
Buffer overflows often can be used to execute arbitrary code, which is usually outside the scope of a program's implicit security policy.
Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability, Access Control, Other
Modify Memory; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Bypass Protection Mechanism; Other
When the consequence is arbitrary code execution, this can often be used to subvert any other security service.
Zapobieganie
Operation, Build and Compilation · Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Skuteczność: Defense in Depth
Architecture and Design
Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a complete solution.
Implementation
Implement and perform bounds checking on input.
Implementation
Do not use dangerous functions such as gets. Use safer, equivalent functions which check for boundary errors.
Operation, Build and Compilation · Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Skuteczność: Defense in Depth
Przykłady podatności
- CVE-2021-35395 Stack-based buffer overflows in SFK for wifi chipset used for IoT/embedded devices, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Słabość nadrzędna
Kiedy powstaje
- Implementation
Dotyczy
Memory-Unsafe, C, C++, Not Technology-Specific
Uwagi
There is significant inconsistency regarding the "buffer overflow" term, which can have multiple interpretations and uses. Many people mean "writing past the end of a buffer." Others mean "writing past the end of a buffer, or before the beginning of a buffer." Still others might include "read" in the term.
Stack-based buffer overflows can instantiate in return address overwrites, stack pointer overwrites or frame pointer overwrites. They can also be considered function pointer overwrites, array index overwrites or write-what-where condition, etc.
Źródła
- Smashing The Stack For Fun And Profit — Aleph One, Phrack, 1996
- Writing Secure Code — Michael Howard, David LeBlanc, Chapter 5, "Stack Overruns" Page 129, Microsoft Press, 2002
- 24 Deadly Sins of Software Security — Michael Howard, David LeBlanc, John Viega, "Sin 5: Buffer Overruns." Page 89, McGraw-Hill, 2010
- The Art of Software Security Assessment — Mark Dowd, John McDonald, Justin Schuh, Chapter 3, "Nonexecutable Stack", Page 76, Addison Wesley, 2006
- The Art of Software Security Assessment — Mark Dowd, John McDonald, Justin Schuh, Chapter 5, "Protection Mechanisms", Page 189, Addison Wesley, 2006
- The CLASP Application Security Process — Secure Software, Inc., 2005
- Address Space Layout Randomization in Windows Vista — Michael Howard
- PaX
- Position Independent Executables (PIE) — Grant Murphy, Red Hat, 2012
- Prelink and address space randomization — John Richard Moser, 2006
- Jump Over ASLR: Attacking Branch Predictors to Bypass ASLR — Dmitry Evtyushkin, Dmitry Ponomarev, Nael Abu-Ghazaleh, 2016
- Stack Frame Canary Validation (D3-SFCV) — D3FEND, 2023
- Segment Address Offset Randomization (D3-SAOR) — D3FEND, 2023
- Bypassing Browser Memory Protections: Setting back browser security by 10 years — Alexander Sotirov and Mark Dowd, Memory information leaks, 2008
- Secure by Design Alert: Eliminating Buffer Overflow Vulnerabilities — Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, 2025
- AddressSanitizer
Wpis z katalogu CWE 4.20.